I'd rather be a cyborg than an "individual" with dementia:exploring critical posthumanism and its application to dementia policy and practice by Jenkins, Nicholas
 UWS Academic Portal
I'd rather be a cyborg than an "individual" with dementia
Jenkins, Nicholas
Published: 27/04/2017
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication on the UWS Academic Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Jenkins, N. (2017). I'd rather be a cyborg than an "individual" with dementia: exploring critical posthumanism and
its application to dementia policy and practice. Paper presented at Aging Graz 2017 International Conference,
Graz, Austria.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the UWS Academic Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact pure@uws.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 17 Sep 2019
Please cite as: Jenkins N. (2017) I’d rather be a cyborg than an individual with 
dementia. Exploring critical posthumanism and its application to dementia policy and 
practice.  Aging Graz, 3rd European Network of Aging Studies (ENAS) Conference, 
University of Graz, Austria 27th-30th April. 
This short paper is based upon theoretical work that I started to develop over the course 
of the last couple of years, looking at how critical posthumanism and the new 
materialisms paradigms can offer fresh directions within contemporary policy, research 
and practice approaches to dementia care. In this paper, I want to draw on those 
perspectives in order to problematize the rise of the ‘individual’ with dementia, which 
has emerged within Western care frameworks largely since the 1990s, as a primary 
vehicle for addressing marginalisation, challenging dehumanisation and promoting 
greater social justice.  And in place of the individual with dementia, I want to argue for a 
‘reclaimed’, ‘grey’ and ‘symbiotic’ construct of the cyborg with dementia, which I believe 
is a sociomaterial construction of subjectivity more aptly suited to engaging critically with 
contemporary developments in the dementia landscape, as well as in advancing 
radically progressive alternatives. 
As authors such as Andy Clarke and Katherine Hayles have argued, the image of the 
cyborg as a ‘monstrous’ fusion of organic and inorganic matter has proved a highly 
popular myth within Western science fiction since the middle of the 20th century due, in 
large part, to the emergence of cybernetics in the 1950s and the expansion of the NASA 
space programme during the 1960s.  Yet, in a now seminal essay within the field of 
Science & Technology Studies, the socialist feminist scholar Donna Haraway argued for 
the need to reclaim this predominantly patriarchal, militaristic myth system and reinvent 
it as one capable of advancing radical and progressive social transformation.  The 
cyborg, Haraway argues, is a ‘trickster’ figure within Western culture and - in keeping 
with the Latin word monere from which the word ‘monster’ is derived - the cyborg serves 
both to warn and to advise us of the nature of subjectivity within technoscience driven, 
capitalist soceties.  Within such societies, the cyborg is, Haraway (1991: 149) argues, 
both ‘a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction’.  Thus, rather than being 
a vision for a distant future humanity, Haraway argues that ‘we are all chimeras, 
theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism’ (Haraway 1991: 180).   In 
Harraway’s hands, rather being a symbol of revulsion or a tool of oppression, embracing 
our cyborg nature has the potential to become profoundly liberating.  Applying 
Haraway’s work on the cyborg to contemporary research, policy and practice priorities in 
dementia, I believe, presents the ageing studies community with a number of important 
opportunities to advance progressive social change, which I hope to be able to 
summarise in the remainder of this paper. 
First, I believe cyborgism presents the progressive dementia community with an 
alternative framework for promoting social justice, to established frameworks that have 
been advanced predominantly from within the liberal humanist tradition.  Since the 
latter decades of the 20th century, in keeping with the rise of what the sociologist Ulrich 
Beck and others have described as the period of second modernity, Western societies 
have witnessed an increasing emphasis on the promotion of the individual, as a 
normative approach to subjectivity in dementia, as well as the individualisation of public 
institutions. By the individual, I am referring here to the implicit belief in an indivisible 
human subject with apriori agency, a unique biography, and whose existence is taken to 
be both self-evident and essentially virtuous. And by individualisation, I am referring to a 
structural shift within Western societies, whereupon said individuals are increasingly 
expected to take control of their own lives and to manage their own life trajectories.  
Within the contemporary dementia policy landscape, and in keeping with the rise of 2nd 
modernity, individualisation is increasingly increasingly forming part of the contemporary 
governmentality of dementia care, to borrow Foucault's term. In Scotland, for example, 
where I live, regulatory frameworks such as the 2011 Standards of Care for Dementia in 
Scotland now require carers to recognise the individuality of people with dementia.  
Further, welfare institutions are services are increasingly being required to enable 
people with dementia to perform their individuality within everyday care settings; 
through, for example, maximising their independence, chosing direct payments and 
demonstrating as much autonomy as the progression of their disease will allow.   
Now, my own research into dementia, which I began a few years ago, has led me 
increasingly to the belief that, as a vehicle for advancing progressive approaches to 
care in dementia, individualisation is something of a modern Janus, or double-edged 
sword - depending on your choice of metaphor.  I have laid out my reasoning for this 
belief in a series of recent papers, which I have sought to bring together and summarise 
in this paper.   First, whilst the rise of the individual has led to the realisation of many 
tangible benefits for people living with progressive neurocognitive conditions, including 
respect for basic rights, I fear that essentializing individualism in dementia risks 
re-enforcing the very concepts and values – namely, of reason, autonomy and 
rationality characteristic of the European Enlightenment - that have positioned people 
with dementia as less than the human ideal.  For example, and as Neil Badmington 
(2000) highlights, Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 
which as many of you will no doubt be aware, forms the back-bone of many 
rights-based approaches to dementia care, draws on the Cartesian notion of ‘the 
cogitating I’ as the primary justification for inherent human worth and uniqueness. In 
other words, the very qualities which Philippe Pinnel in his Treatise on Insanity in 1806, 
describes as absent amongst people with dementia.  Following the work of critical 
posthumanist scholars such as Cary Wolfe (2010) and Rosi Braidotti (2013), I think we 
can view the rise of individualisation in dementia as an aspect of ‘compensatory’ 
humanism; in other words, a framework that - in seeking to advance the cause of social 
justice - actually reinforces the very normative constructions of subjectivity that  are 
detrimental to those who it is seeking to include.  As Wolfe argues: 
‘A fundamental problem with the liberal humanist model is not so much what it 
wants as the price it pays for what it wants: that in its attempt to recognise the 
uniqueness of the other, it reinstates the normative model of subjectivity that it 
insists is the problem in the first place.’ 
In contrast, Haraway’s imaginary of the cyborg does not seek to construct a unified, 
discrete and bounded self - what she describes as the ‘seduction to organic wholeness’ 
(Haraway 1991: 150) and which has become somewhat lionised within the liberal 
humanist approach to person-centred approaches to dementia care.  Cyborgs are, 
instead, inherently partial and incomplete subjectivities that, as such, have the ability to 
‘transgress boundaries’ in order to create new ‘potent fusions’ (Haraway 1991: 154).  In 
this fashion, cyborgs living with progressive neurocognitive diseases are not required to 
‘re-arrange’ their Being into a seemingly coherent and unified self; through for example, 
engaging in reminiscence.  Rather, cyborgism encourages us to view Alzheimer’s 
disease and related disorders as part of a complex, non-unified and inherently partial 
montage of selfhood; a non-unified subjectivity that is perpetually in a state of becoming.  
In this respect, embracing cyborgism may enable the progressive dementia community 
to move away from assertions of the essential humanity of people with dementia as the 
primary vehicle for achieving social justice. Such assertions may have been a 
necessary in recent years, as I have argued, in the context of widespread and 
systematic dehumanisation of people with dementia .  However, and as Haraway again 
argues, the bridge between essentialisation and the ‘policing of consciousness’ 
(Harraway 1991: 159) is a short one and quickly leads to a governmentality of 
individualism in dementia that I alluded to previously.  Cyborgism, in contrast, 
encourages us to believe that there are no essential qualities to being a person with 
dementia, just as there are no essential qualities to being member of any other 
dominant or marginalised group.  Unity, in this respect, is not apriori but must be built 
and re-built through social relationship.  In this context, cyborgism encourages us to 
move beyond-and-through the human in order to establish new progressive 
connections, which may include meaningful connections with nonhuman entities.  As 
Haraway (1991: 154) argues, ‘a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily 
relations in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines.’   
Related to this point, my second reason for champoining cyborgism in dementia is due 
to rapid advances in technoscience that have occurred since the latter decades of the 
20th century, and which are increasingly transforming the landscapes of dementia in the 
21st century.  Developments such as Web 2.0, the Internet of Things, Big Data and 
Deep Structured Learning, for example, are facilitating new, ‘Technology Enabled’ 
approaches within dementia care and thus dementia, in the 21st century, is increasingly 
becoming mediated via digital technologies.  In this context, cyborgism provides us with 
a framework for understanding and responding to what Haraway (1991) refers to as the 
‘informatics of domination’; in other words, ‘the translation of the world into a problem of 
coding’ in which ‘communication technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools 
recrafting our bodies’ (p.164).  Haraway’s imagery of the cyborg provides a critical 
framework for exploring the rise of Technology Enabled dementia care, whist avoiding 
decent into technophobia and reactionary assertions of essential humanity.  Instead, 
cyborgism enables us to consider critically how the use of technologies such as Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS), may be re-crafting embodied subjectivity in dementia.  It 
invites us to ask cui bono? Whose interests are being served in the deployment of such 
technologies and how might cyborgs with dementia reclaim these technologies within 
their everyday lives? 
In summary, the influence of critical theory within mainstream dementia care research, 
policy and practice has, to date, been somewhat limited. Yet established critical 
perspectives within the humanities and Science and Technology Studies have much to 
offer the dementia studies community in developing critical insights into the shifting, and 
increasingly technologically mediated landscapes of dementia in the 21st century.  
Critical posthumanism, as well as the broader new materialisms paradigm, have much 
to offer in the development of socialist and feminist-inspired approaches to dementia.  
As the sociologist Joanna Latimer highlights, such approaches can help us to ‘break the 
thinking shackles of humanism’ and explore what bodies with dementia can truly do, 
once we become open to new possibilities of thinking and materialising subjectivity. In 
this context, Haraway’s seminal work on the cyborg offers the dementia studies 
community a narrative that matters – a way of understanding the relationship between 
dementia and embodied selfhood in ways that serve to foster progressive and 
egalitarian social relationships, including relationship with nonhuman entities.  It is an 
approach highly compatible with the work of other contemporary critical posthumanists, 
such as Rosi Braidotti’s framework of becoming animal, becoming earth and becoming 
machine, as well as Haraway’s later work on companion species. As such, rapid 
developments in technology enabled care as well increasing interest in animal 
assistance interventions, such as the Dementia Dogs initiaitve in Scotland, may actually 
provide important and fertile grounds for developing applied, posthumanist-inspired 
approaches to dementia.  Haraway famously asserted that she would ‘rather be a 
cyborg than a Goddess’.  In a similar vein, I believe the dementia studies community 
could usefully explore what a radical approach to dementia might look like in the 21st 
century, with the cyborg (as opposed to the individual) at its centre.  Thank you. 
